| South Korea | 210 d | Comprehensive data; 210 days strategic oil but only 9 days working LNG inventory |
| Singapore | 245 d | Excellent data; 245 days reserves (includes foreign-owned storage); 95% gas generation is the exposure |
Reserve depth measures how long a country can absorb a shortfall, not whether it can distribute what it has. The Philippines declared an emergency at 45 days; Thailand, at 95, has not. Those are not two points on one scale.
current_status, verbatim.Cuba disclaims membership in its own entry, and is kept because the corpus keeps it — marked refused rather than quietly dropped. An atlas that silently drops its awkward row is not showing you the corpus.
| Country | Stored | What the corpus says about that figure — verbatim | Treated as |
|---|---|---|---|
| Philippines | 45 d | Declared national energy emergency March 2026; public reserve data available |
on the axis |
| Thailand | 95 d | Good reserve data; active government conservation measures documented |
on the axis |
| South Korea | 210 d | Comprehensive data; 210 days strategic oil but only 9 days working LNG inventory |
off the axis |
| Vietnam | 30 d | Generation mix clear; reserve data weak (20-45 days range); actively pursuing Russian alternatives |
range |
| India | 50 d | Extensive official data; reserve estimates vary (25-74 days); diversification actively underway |
range |
| Japan | 257 d | Best data coverage of any country; 254-260 days of reserves; comprehensive IEA/EIA profiles |
range |
| Singapore | 245 d | Excellent data; 245 days reserves (includes foreign-owned storage); 95% gas generation is the exposure |
off the axis |
South Korea's 210 days is strategic oil; its working LNG inventory is nine. None of this is new research — every word was already in the corpus, in a field the published map renders as a footnote.
| Country | Interpreted band | Conf. | Oil | LNG | Reserve | Fossil |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Sri Lanka | Already stressed | medium | 85% | none | none | 45% |
| Already rationing fuel with no public reserve data — Hormuz is an accelerant on existing fragility. Hydro 37%, solar 14%, coal/oil 45% If it persists: Minimal. Small domestic hydro base helps but insufficient. Emergency purchases at extreme premiums. Capacity to ration: Already rationing. Prior 2022 economic crisis built institutional muscle for austerity measures but population tolerance is low.Active crisis well-documented; reserve data limited; LNG import data sparse | ||||||
| Bangladesh | Already stressed | medium | 95% | 99% | none | 89% |
| 99% of LNG from Qatar/UAE, military deployed for fuel hoarding, universities shut — no reserve data public. Gas 47%, coal 30%, oil 12%, renewables 4% If it persists: Near zero. 99% of LNG from Qatar and UAE. No pipeline alternatives. Domestic gas production declining. Capacity to ration: Low. Military enforcement suggests political stress. History of grid instability and load-shedding even before crisis.Active crisis documented; reserve data unavailable; 99% of LNG from Qatar/UAE | ||||||
| Philippines | Already stressed | high | 92% | none | 45 d | 76% |
| 92% of oil from the Gulf, 45 days of reserves, energy emergency already declared. Coal 53%, gas 18%, renewables 12%, oil 5% If it persists: Limited. No pipeline alternatives. Attempting emergency spot purchases. Domestic coal dominant but imported. Capacity to ration: Low. Limited state capacity to manage prolonged shortage. History of grid stress during typhoon season. | ||||||
| Pakistan | Acute if disruption persists | low | 95% | 99% | none | 49% |
| Government says 74% domestic power sources, but 99% of LNG from Gulf, no public reserve data, universities already shut. Gas 25%, hydro 19%, coal 14%, nuclear 13%, renewables 13%, oil 10% If it persists: More diversified generation than it appears (hydro 19%, nuclear 13%). But 99% of LNG from Qatar/UAE. Domestic gas declining. No strategic reserve data public. Capacity to ration: Low. History of political instability and grid management challenges. Already experiencing rolling blackouts in many regions pre-crisis.Reserve data unavailable; conflicting reports on domestic vs import dependency; 99% of LNG from Gulf | ||||||
| Taiwan | Acute if disruption persists | low | 70% | none | none | 85% |
| 85% fossil generation, no public reserve data, decommissioned nuclear — the data gap is the red flag. Gas 42%, coal 39%, nuclear 4%, renewables 12% If it persists: Limited. Decommissioned nuclear (restart planned). Coal stockpiles provide some buffer. But 42% gas generation with unclear LNG source diversification. Capacity to ration: High state capacity. But the absence of public reserve data is itself a signal — either reserves are thin or disclosure is politically sensitive.Generation mix clear; reserve data essentially unavailable publicly; no crisis reporting yet | ||||||
| Vietnam | Acute if disruption persists | medium | 90% | 49% | 30 d | 61% |
| Coal and hydro provide a generation buffer, but 90% of oil is from the Gulf and reserves are thin at 20-45 days. Coal 52%, hydro 31%, gas 6%, solar/wind 8% If it persists: Pursuing Russian alternatives. Domestic coal and hydro provide buffer. LNG dependency still small. Emergency procurement of 4M barrels non-Middle-Eastern oil (~6 days). Capacity to ration: Moderate. Coal and hydro provide structural resilience. The vulnerability is oil for transport and industry, not electricity generation. | ||||||
| Thailand | Acute if disruption persists | high | 80% | 28% | 95 d | 80% |
| 95 days of reserves and active conservation measures, but 55% gas-fired generation is the structural exposure. Gas 55%, coal 20%, renewables 15%, oil 5% If it persists: Limited. Some pipeline gas from Myanmar. Qatar supplies 28% of LNG (second-largest buyer). Exploring alternatives. Capacity to ration: Moderate. Government acting early with conservation measures. 95 days provides buffer but gas-heavy generation mix is the vulnerability. | ||||||
| South Korea | Acute if disruption persists | high | 70% | 18% | 210 d | 74% |
| 210 days of strategic oil reserves but only 9 days of working LNG inventory — the mismatch is the risk. Coal 42%, gas 27%, nuclear 18%, renewables 8% If it persists: Some. Nuclear provides 18% baseload. Coal stockpiles exist. But working LNG terminal inventory is only ~9 days despite 210-day strategic oil reserve. Capacity to ration: High state capacity. Institutional ability to enforce conservation. The gap between 210-day oil reserves and 9-day LNG working stock is the real vulnerability. | ||||||
| India | Price shock first, physical shortage later | high | 45% | 53% | 50 d | 77% |
| Coal-dominant grid limits electricity exposure, but 88% oil import dependent and 90% of LPG through Hormuz. Coal 73%, renewables 12%, gas 4%, nuclear 3%, hydro 8% If it persists: Best positioned of the vulnerable countries. Coal-dominant generation reduces electricity exposure. Russian oil deals active. But 88% oil import dependent overall. Capacity to ration: High state capacity. Large domestic coal base insulates electricity. Primary risk is transport fuel and LPG for cooking, not grid collapse. | ||||||
| Japan | Price shock first, physical shortage later | high | 77% | 7% | 257 d | 70% |
| 257 days of reserves and strong state capacity — pain is price, not blackouts, unless disruption extends past 6 months. Coal 32%, gas 33%, nuclear 10%, renewables 20%, oil 5% If it persists: Best in Asia. Massive strategic reserves. Nuclear restart program. Diversified LNG sources. But volume dependency on Gulf crude is structurally high. Capacity to ration: Very high state capacity. Institutional experience from Fukushima energy conservation. Can sustain months of elevated prices before physical shortage. | ||||||
| Singapore | Resilient but expensive | high | 70% | 45% | 245 d | 95% |
| 95% gas generation and 45% of LNG from Qatar — money buys time, not immunity. Gas 95%, solar 2%, other 3% If it persists: Large storage capacity (245 days, though much is foreign-owned). Refining hub status provides some flexibility. But 95% gas generation is extreme single-fuel exposure. Capacity to ration: Very high state capacity and fiscal reserves. Can subsidize and purchase at premium for extended period. The question is whether global LNG supply physically exists at any price. | ||||||
| Cuba | Special case: distorted substrate | medium | none | none | none | 82% |
| Not a Hormuz case. Already inside the wreckage from US sanctions cutting Venezuelan oil. Hormuz amplifies via global prices. Fossil fuels 82%, renewables 18% If it persists: Venezuelan supply cut by US policy. Russian humanitarian shipments. No market alternatives at scale. Decrepit domestic generation infrastructure. Capacity to ration: Already beyond rationing into collapse. Not a Hormuz case — this is blockade + infrastructure decay + loss of benefactor supply. Hormuz is an amplifier through global price pressure.Grid collapse well-documented; not primarily Hormuz-driven; Venezuelan/US sanctions are the primary mechanism | ||||||
confidence: low.stress_band, and none can honestly be reconstructed.The field was introduced in commit 1ecc1de (2026-03-29) and never edited.
That commit names the inputs — “12 countries scored on 7 dimensions” — then enumerates
which country landed in which band. It states no threshold, weight, or ordering rule; its
own framing is “stress bands, not countdown clocks.” The repository's
schema.yaml governs the U.S. case corpus only. No threshold table exists
anywhere in the repository or its siblings.
Nor are the classes a scale. “Already stressed” is a present state, “acute if disruption persists” a conditional, “price shock first, physical shortage later” a sequencing claim, “resilient but expensive” a cost judgment. They describe different kinds of thing, and nothing in the corpus ranks them — so nothing here does. The map's colours are categorical for that reason, and an earlier draft of this page that ordered the classes and called two of them “severest” was wrong: that ranking was invented here, not found in the corpus.
A formula could be back-fitted to the twelve current values. That would be an invention
presented as a method, so it has not been done. stress_band therefore
renders as interpreted everywhere it appears — including
on the map above, which is drawn in neutral ink for that reason.
The named inputs, so the judgment is at least inspectable: chokepoint oil share, chokepoint LNG share, reserve days, generation mix, current status, alternative supply, rationing capacity. Four of the twelve are missing at least one; Cuba is missing three.
The map's geography is not the corpus's. countries.geojson carries a
hand-drawn outline per country — 9 to 31 vertices, roughly the right place, not the right
shape. Rendering those implied a cartographic fidelity the corpus does not have, so they
are no longer drawn. National boundaries here are vendored substrate — Natural Earth 1:50m Admin 0, v5.1.2, public domain (vendor/boundaries/PROVENANCE.md) — joined
to the corpus by ISO country code at build time. They are reference geography: they carry
no claim, and the build fails if a corpus country has no boundary rather than dropping it.
The corpus polygons are left untouched in the data; they are simply not the render path.
Everything derived on this page. Two computations, both stating their rule where they appear: the evidence window (2026-01-01 → 2026-08-12) is min/max of all receipt dates, and the qualifier flag is the rule given under the reserve table. Everything else is presentational and encodes nothing: sort order, the 60-day line, the shaded quadrant, label placement on both figures, and the minimum mark size that keeps Singapore visible on the map — which exaggerates its area, one reason area is not an encoding there. Confidence is the corpus's own field, reproduced unchanged; it rates a country's inputs, never the band assignment.
| Supports | Publisher | Published |
|---|---|---|
| Bangladesh | The Conversation | 2026-07-01 |
| Bangladesh | Reuters | 2026-03-06 |
| Cuba | Reuters | 2026-03-05 |
| Cuba | NPR | 2026-03-26 |
| India | India Briefing | 2026-03-15 |
| India | IEA | 2026-01-01 |
| India | Lloyd's List Intelligence | 2026-08-12 |
| Japan | Energy Tracker Asia | 2026-03-08 |
| Japan | Al Jazeera | 2026-03-23 |
| Japan | Lloyd's List Intelligence | 2026-08-12 |
| Pakistan | The Conversation | 2026-07-01 |
| Pakistan | Reuters | 2026-03-13 |
| Philippines | The Conversation | 2026-07-01 |
| Philippines | Reuters | 2026-03-24 |
| Singapore | EMA Singapore | 2026-01-01 |
| Singapore | CNBC | 2026-03-03 |
| Singapore | Lloyd's List Intelligence | 2026-08-12 |
| South Korea | Reuters | 2026-03-24 |
| South Korea | Zero Carbon Analytics | 2026-03-10 |
| South Korea | Lloyd's List Intelligence | 2026-08-12 |
| Sri Lanka | The Conversation | 2026-07-01 |
| Sri Lanka | Atlantic Council | 2026-03-20 |
| Taiwan | Low-Carbon Power | 2026-01-01 |
| Taiwan | Zero Carbon Analytics | 2026-03-10 |
| Taiwan | Lloyd's List Intelligence | 2026-08-12 |
| Thailand | Reuters | 2026-03-10 |
| Thailand | CNBC | 2026-03-03 |
| Thailand | Lloyd's List Intelligence | 2026-08-12 |
| Vietnam | Reuters | 2026-03-23 |
| Vietnam | Reuters | 2026-03-26 |
| Vietnam | Lloyd's List Intelligence | 2026-08-12 |